EHRM, 13-01-2015, nr. 44230/06

The applicant pointed out that issues pertaining to nationality were not within States' exclusive competence if they affected human rights. He submitted that the Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunisia and Morocco Advisory Opinion and the Nottebohm Case reflected the situation of international law in 1923 and 1955, respectively, and not at the present time. He argued that there was an emerging international consensus that nationality laws and practice had to be consistent with general principles of international law, in particular human rights law. State discretion in granting nationality was not completely unfettered; referring to Article 15 § 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the applicant argued that decisions concerning nationality were to be examined in the light of human rights. He cited paragraphs 32 and 140, respectively, of two relevant cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (see paragraphs 43 and 44 above). The applicant alleged that the Inter-American approach was also confirmed in Europe, relying on Article 4 of the European Convention of Nationality and its Explanatory Report. The applicant described his status as a ‘non-citizen’ and considered himself a ‘privileged’ stateless person in terms of international law. He also referred to the Nottebohm Case and explained that he was born in Latvia, his habitual residence and centre of interests was in Latvia, and his wife and two daughters lived in Latvia. He asserted that he had no genuine or effective links with any other country.

Recognising that the right to a particular citizenship was not as such guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, the applicant relied on the Court's decision in the case of Karassev v. Finland ((dec.), no. 31414/96, ECHR 1999-II) and argued that arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact on the rights of an individual. He further referred to the case of Genovese v. Malta (no. 53124/09, § 45, 11 October 2011), where the Court had found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 concerning access to citizenship. The applicant argued that it had been found in other international fora that national competence for the establishment of rules on citizenship was not exclusive; he referred to the above-cited Rottmann case before the Court of Justice of the European Union as an example. He also argued that for the purposes of the present case the obligation to reduce statelessness limited State discretion and, relying on the case of Andrejeva v. Latvia ([GC], no. 55707/00, § 88, ECHR 2009), asserted that Latvia was the only State with which he had stable legal ties.

The applicant conceded that he did not have a right to acquire Latvian citizenship under the Convention; his argument was that his rights under Articles 10 and 11 had been breached during the naturalisation process. Nothing in the Court's case-law suggested that only issues under Articles 8 and 14 could arise. It was his view that ‘arbitrary denial of citizenship’ could also raise issues under Articles 10 and 11. The applicant argued that there was a sufficient causal link between his participation in activities against the introduction of the State language of the Republic of Latvia in schools which had the Russian language as their language of instruction and the subsequent decision of the Cabinet of Ministers to refuse his naturalisation. He considered that ‘the denial of citizenship’ was a punitive measure used against him in response to his activities and statements.

The applicant disagreed with the Government that the Ezelin case was to be distinguished from the present case. The applicant submitted that the nature and severity of the sanction imposed were factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of the interference (he referred to Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, § 64, ECHR 1999-IV). The refusal to grant him Latvian citizenship had had a number of immediate consequences. He mentioned one such example: the fact that he could not stand for the municipal elections held in 2005 because he could re-apply for naturalisation only after one year (section 12(6) of the Citizenship Law). Such a consequence had not been foreseeable given the positive opinion of the Security Police. The applicant remained a ‘non-citizen’ and was excluded from fully-fledged participation in the political processes. He pointed out that he did not have the right to vote or stand as candidate in any elections — municipal or parliamentary, or in the elections for the European Parliament.

While agreeing that the sanctions did not prevent him from expressing himself, they had nonetheless in his view amounted to a kind of censorship which was likely to discourage him from making criticisms of that kind again in the future (he referred to Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 44, Series A no. 103). More generally, the applicant submitted that the measures taken by the domestic authorities were capable of discouraging the participation of ‘non-citizens’ in debates over matters of legitimate public concern (he cited Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 64, ECHR 1999-III).

In response to the Government's argument that he had not fulfilled the precondition of loyalty, the applicant drew a distinction between loyalty to the State and loyalty to the government. He acknowledged that the requirement of loyalty to the State might be legitimate, but that it should not be used to counter pluralism of views where such views were expressed in compliance with the law (he referred to Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, §§ 166–167, ECHR 2010). The applicant further alleged that the Government had not provided evidence as to his alleged calls to overthrow the government, to use violence and to trigger an international scandal. The applicant was surprised that the Government had referred to media reports in order to substantiate the allegations, when more objective evidence could have been found. He referred to the positive opinion by the Security Police and mentioned that he had been punished only once with a written warning for participation in a demonstration and that no criminal sanctions had ever been imposed on him; media reports only reflected the opinions of their authors. He relied on the same statements from the media (see paragraph 17 above) to argue that his protests had been staged only against the particular government led by Prime Minister, and the ruling coalition, not against any legitimate government whatsoever; that he had not wished to use any violence; his invitation ‘to a boxing contest in a police sports club’ had been made to avoid any violence on the streets. Lastly, the statements made during his interview of 10 December 2004 could not have been grounds for the refusal since it had been given after the Cabinet of Ministers had refused to grant him Latvian citizenship.

In any event, freedom of expression also covered ideas and expression that offended, shocked or disturbed (he cited Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 7 December 1976, § 49, Series A no. 24) and freedom of assembly also protected demonstrations that might annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that they were seeking to promote (he referred to Plattform‘Ärzte für das Leben’v. Austria, 21 June 1988, § 32, Series A no. 139). Furthermore, the limits of criticism were wider in relation to the government than to a private citizen (he cited Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992, § 46, Series A no. 236).

The Government insisted that the applicant's complaint was a disguised attempt to complain about the fact that his naturalisation application had been refused. They maintained that the applicant had not shown how that refusal had interfered with or had otherwise had a negative impact on his rights and freedoms under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.

According to the Government, the denial of naturalisation in no way affected the applicant's rights and freedoms. The Government referred to extensive media coverage reflecting the applicant's public statements, in which he had freely expressed his views and position on the education reform and also his plans and actions in that connection. The media coverage also reflected the applicant's participation in further meetings and demonstrations in 2005. He had become an assistant to a Member of the European Parliament, Ms Ždanoka, and had continued to speak out against government policy as regards the education reform. The Government mentioned specific examples of meetings in which the applicant had participated since the 16 November 2004 decision (for example, a meeting of 6 December 2004 concerning the education reform). In addition, they mentioned that in 2012 the applicant had been one of the organisers of a collection of signatures to initiate a referendum on citizenship for ‘non-citizens’. In the same year, the applicant had participated in establishing a body called ‘the Congress of Non-Citizens’, and within it, on 1 June 2013, he had been elected a member of a self-proclaimed ‘Parliament of the Unrepresented’. He had participated in a number of conferences, protests and demonstrations, in which he had freely expressed his opinion that ‘non-citizens’ should be automatically granted citizenship.

Nor had the applicant been subjected to any punishment, penalty, prosecution or conviction by any of the State institutions for his opinions or public remarks. The Government referred to the case of Jokšas v. Lithuania (no. 25330/07, 12 November 2013) and considered it relevant for the purposes of the present case in so far as, in that case, no interference and, accordingly, no violation, had been found in the absence of any disciplinary sanction, prosecution or conviction for public remarks.

The Government disagreed with the applicant that the refusal by the Latvian authorities to grant him citizenship had been a punitive measure and distinguished the present case from Ezelin v. France (26 April 1991, Series A no. 202). In the latter case the applicant had received a disciplinary sanction for participating in a demonstration; such a punishment leaving negative legal consequences on the applicant's employment record. In the present case, however, the refusal to grant citizenship had only had one immediate consequence — inability at a given moment of time to obtain Latvian citizenship. The Government reiterated that there had been no adverse effects on the applicant's rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention and that the refusal did not prevent the applicant from submitting a new request in the future.

The Government also considered that the present case should be distinguished from the cases of Redfearn and Vogt, where the applicants had subsequently experienced difficulties in finding employment after dismissal (Redfearn v. the United Kingdom, no. 47335/06, 6 November 2012, and Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, Series A no. 323). By contrast, the refusal of Latvian citizenship through naturalisation in the present case did not irreversibly entail any difficulties for the applicant as he could re-apply for Latvian citizenship. Nor did it create any negative consequences for his political career. The fact that the applicant had not re-applied for naturalisation showed that he had never had any genuine intention of obtaining Latvian citizenship.

The Government referred to the above-cited Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunisia and Morocco Advisory Opinion and Nottebohm Case, arguing that under international law questions of nationality fell within the exclusive competence of the States and were a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Regulation in international law on the subject of nationality remained fragmented — it covered such areas as conflicts of jurisdiction to decide on nationality and State succession, none of which were relevant for the purposes of the present case. The Government mentioned that attempts to develop more unified standards regarding nationality in general were still underway, pointing to the fact that the European Convention on Nationality had been ratified by only 16 States at the time of the Government's submission of their first observations (now by 20 States, see paragraph 39 above).

With reference to the Strasbourg case-law (Family K. and W. v. the Netherlands, no. 11278/84, Commission decision of 1 July 1985, Decisions and Reports (DR) 43, p. 216; Slepcik v. the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, no. 30913/96, Commission decision of 2 September 1996, DR 86-B, p. 176; and Jazvinsky v. the Slovak Republic (dec.), nos. 33088/96, 52236/99, 52451/99, 52452/99, 52453/99, 52455/99, 52457/99, 52458/99, 52459/99, 7 December 2000), the Government reiterated that the right to citizenship of a certain State was not among the rights guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols.

Referring to the ruling of the Constitutional Court in case no. 2009-94-01, the Government argued that the State had a wide margin of appreciation in laying down rules on citizenship (see paragraph 36 above). The Government reiterated that naturalisation was a political decision of the State and that every State had a mechanism aimed at identifying citizens who were loyal to that particular State; the State could not be obliged to grant citizenship to persons it considered non-integrated, disloyal and untrustworthy.

Latvian law did not guarantee a right to acquire Latvian citizenship by naturalisation; it merely provided for a right to apply for it if certain criteria were met. The Government further explained the two-step process of naturalisation. First, the Naturalisation Board carried out the administrative task of receiving and reviewing individual applications to determine whether or not they met the criteria laid down by law, and its decision was amenable to judicial review pursuant to section 17(3) of the Citizenship Law. Second, the Cabinet of Minister's task was one of a discretionary nature, among other things to take account of political considerations including the person's loyalty to the Republic of Latvia. The Cabinet of Ministers had concluded that the applicant's statements and actions were aimed at destabilising the situation in the State and that he had misused the naturalisation procedure to achieve that aim (see paragraph 17 above).

Moreover, the applicant's statements and actions were incompatible with the fundamental values of the Republic of Latvia as a democratic State and he had not fulfilled the loyalty precondition under Article 18 of the Citizenship Law. Referring to the above-cited Nottebohm Case, the Government considered it normal to request that naturalisation applicants demonstrate a genuine connection to the country, including a certain level of loyalty to the Republic of Latvia when acquiring its citizenship. While acknowledging that in principle Article 10 of the Convention protected the right to express oneself in a way which offended, shocked or disturbed, the Government also noted that a person exercising his freedom of expression undertook duties and responsibilities, the scope of which depended on the particular situation (they referred to Handyside, cited above, § 49). In the Government's view, the applicant had a duty to choose the means by which he wished to achieve his goals and refrain from provocative statements regarding the possibility of using violence, thus undermining the fundamental values of the democratic society. Similarly, they noted that Article 11 of the Convention did not protect those who had violent intentions resulting in public disorder (they cited G. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, no. 10833/84, Commission decision of 13 October 1987).

In the present case, the applicant could not be seen as exercising his freedom of expression or assembly when advocating ideas concerning the Russian-speaking community and the education reform. By refusing to grant him citizenship through naturalisation, the objective of the Cabinet of Ministers had been not to punish the applicant for any misdeeds, but to protect democracy as established in the Constitution.

Lastly, in their post-admissibility observations the Government noted that in the domestic proceedings the applicant had never complained of any interference with or restriction of his freedom of expression or assembly. Instead he had expressly complained about the decision on the refusal of naturalisation, and in their view this case was thus to be contrasted with that of Heinisch v. Germany (no. 28274/08, ECHR 2011 (extracts)).

The Court's Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland (no. 16354/06, § 48, ECHR 2012 (extracts)) reiterated the fundamental principles as regards freedom of expression (referring to the cases of Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, § 101, ECHR 2007 V, and Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 87, ECHR 2005-II) as follows:

The Court also emphasises the ‘chilling effect’ that the fear of sanctions has on the exercise of freedom of expression. This effect, which works to the detriment of society as a whole, is likewise a factor which concerns the proportionality of, and thus the justification for, the sanctions imposed on individuals (see Kudeshkina v. Russia, no. 29492/05, § 99, 26 February 2009 with further references).

The exceptions to the rule of freedom of association set out in Article 11 are, like those in Article 10, to be construed strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on that freedom. Any interference must correspond to a ‘pressing social need’; thus, the notion ‘necessary’ does not have the flexibility of such expressions as ‘useful’ or ‘desirable’ (see Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, § 95, ECHR 2004-I).

The Court has recently reiterated that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a ‘democratic society’. Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position. Pluralism and democracy must also be based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise necessarily entailing various concessions on the part of individuals or groups of individuals which are justified in order to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society (see S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, § 128, ECHR 2014 (extracts) with further references). Respect by the State of the views of a minority by tolerating conduct which is not per se incompatible with the values of a democratic society or wholly outside the norms of conduct of such a society, far from creating unjust inequalities or discrimination, ensures cohesive and stable pluralism and promotes harmony and tolerance in society (see, mutatis mutandis, Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, § 126, ECHR 2011).

The Court has also held that a ‘remark directed against the Convention's underlying values’ is removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17 (see Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, § 53, Reports 1998-VII, and Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX). The freedoms guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention cannot deprive the authorities of a State in which an association, through its activities, jeopardises that State's institutions, of the right to protect those institutions. In this connection, the Court points out that it has previously held that some compromise between the requirements of defending democratic society and individual rights is inherent in the Convention system. For there to be a compromise of that sort, any intervention by the authorities must be in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 11. Only when that review is complete will the Court be in a position to decide, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, whether Article 17 of the Convention should be applied (see Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 96, ECHR 2003-II).

The Court considers that no one should be authorised to rely on the Convention's provisions in order to weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society. Consequently, in order to guarantee the stability and effectiveness of a democratic system, the State may be required to take specific measures to protect itself. Every time a State intends to rely on the principle of ‘a democracy capable of defending itself’ in order to justify interference with individual rights, it must carefully evaluate the scope and consequences of the measure under consideration, to ensure that the aforementioned balance is achieved (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, §§ 99 and 100, ECHR 2006-IV).

Lastly, the Court reiterates that a ‘right to nationality’ similar to that in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or a right to acquire or retain a particular nationality, is not guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols. Nevertheless, the Court has not excluded the possibility that an arbitrary denial of nationality might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life of the individual (see Karassev, cited above, and Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no. 48321/99, § 77, ECHR 2002-II). Likewise, the Court has ruled that no right to renounce citizenship is guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols; but it cannot exclude that an arbitrary refusal of a request to renounce citizenship might in certain very exceptional circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention if such a refusal has an impact on the individual's private life (see Riener v. Bulgaria, no. 46343/99, §§ 153–154, 23 May 2006).

Thus, the Court has considered that in circumstances where a member State has gone beyond its obligations under Article 8 in creating a right to citizenship by descent and has established a procedure to that end, that State consequently must ensure that the right is secured without discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention (see Genovese, cited above, § 34).

The Court notes that the applicant considered his freedom of expression and assembly to have been interfered with by the fact that the Cabinet of Ministers had adopted a negative decision regarding his application to acquire Latvian citizenship through naturalisation and thus punished him for his views and had a chilling effect on the exercise of his freedoms. The Government distinguished between the decision not to grant citizenship through naturalisation and the right to freedom of expression, where the latter could be freely exercised by the applicant with or without Latvian citizenship.

In view of the Court's decision to join to the merits the Government's objection to the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae (see paragraph 4 above), the first question that the Court needs to determine now is whether Articles 10 and 11 are applicable in the circumstances of the present case.

The applicant alleged that the refusal to grant him Latvian citizenship through naturalisation was a punitive measure in response to the views he had expressed during the various demonstrations against the education reform. The Court observes, however, that the applicant had been able freely to express his views, which had been widely reported in the mass media at the time (see paragraphs 8, 15, 17 and 56 above). Besides, he continued to express his views on the education reform without any hindrance after his application for naturalisation was refused (see paragraphs 8 and 15 above). Furthermore, the applicant remained politically active and continued to express his views also on other matters of public interest (see paragraph 56 above). The Court notes that the availability or absence of a given civil status does not appear to have interfered with the applicant's civic activities. Even though the applicant maintained that the decision regarding his naturalisation application had affected his courage to speak up and had, therefore, impeded his participation in debates on matters of public interest, the Government submitted ample evidence to the contrary (see paragraphs 8, 15, 17 and 56 above) and the applicant did not further substantiate his allegation or submit any proof in this connection. Nor is there any other information in the Court's possession suggesting that the Government's policy relating to citizenship may have generated a chilling effect for the applicant or those expressing similar views.

The applicant mentioned one tangible consequence of the refusal of naturalisation: he could not vote or stand for municipal and parliamentary elections, or elections to the European Parliament. However, the Court observes that the applicant's complaint in the present case does not concern the rights that are laid down in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (contrast Ždanoka, cited above, § 73). Nor does the applicant allege a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of being unable to preserve his current civil status (contrast Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 314, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). Above all, the Court's decision on the admissibility of the present application determines the scope of the case currently before it and it does not include any complaints other than those under Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above).

Furthermore, the applicant himself admitted that he had never been subjected to a criminal sanction for expressing his opinion or for participating in a demonstration. It appears that he had received one warning for participating in a protest; however, he did not specify any further details in this regard — date, place or context.

The Court will now assess whether the decision on naturalisation had any punitive character for the purpose of the exercise of the applicant's freedom of expression and assembly. In accordance with international law, decisions on naturalisation or any other form of granting of nationality are matters primarily falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the State; they are normally based on various criteria aimed at establishing a link between the State and the person requesting nationality (see paragraphs 37 and 38 above). While the European Convention on Nationality has not been widely ratified by the Council of Europe member States (see paragraph 39 above), as noted in its Explanatory Report, its definition relies on the traditional understanding of a bond of nationality as expressed by the ICJ in the Nottebohm Case (see paragraphs 40 and 41 above). The choice of the criteria for the purposes of a naturalisation procedure is not, in principle, subject to any particular rules of international law and the States are free to decide on individual naturalisation (see paragraph 38 above). In certain situations, however, the States' discretion may be limited by the principle of non-intervention, according to which a State is prohibited from interfering in the internal or foreign affairs of another State (see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ judgment of 27 June 1986, paragraphs 202–205). Nevertheless, such limitation cannot be considered of any relevance for the purposes of the present case.

In this respect, the applicant advanced two arguments to claim that the State's discretion was not completely unfettered in matters relating to the granting of nationality. First, he referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, as the Court has already noted above, under the Convention there is no ‘right to nationality’ similar to that in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see paragraph 73 above). The applicant's reference to the case-law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is likewise misguided, since the American Convention on Human Rights, which is a regional instrument, explicitly provides for a right to nationality in its Article 20 (see paragraphs 43–45 above).

The applicant's second argument was that the State's discretion was limited by the obligation to reduce statelessness. The Court observes that the applicant belongs to a category of Latvian residents who were granted a specific civil status under domestic law — ‘permanently resident non-citizens’ (nepilsoņi) — that is, citizens of the former USSR who lost their Soviet citizenship following the dissolution of the USSR but, while being so entitled, have not subsequently obtained any other nationality (see, for more details relating to categories of Latvian residents, Slivenko, cited above, §§ 50–53, and Sisojeva and Others, cited above, §§ 46–47). The applicant has not shown how the availability or not of a given status in domestic law would have affected his exercise of freedom of expression and assembly.

Turning now to the Convention system, the Court reiterates that in some circumstances it has ruled that arbitrary or discriminatory decisions in the field of nationality may raise issues in human rights law in general and under the Convention specifically (see the above-cited cases of Karassev, Riener, § 153, and Genovese, § 34). However, as noted above, neither the Convention nor international law in general provides for the right to acquire a specific nationality. The applicant has accepted this. The Court observes that there is nothing in the Latvian Citizenship Law to indicate that the applicant could unconditionally claim a right to Latvian citizenship (see paragraphs 20, 29 and 63 above) or that the negative decision of the Cabinet of Ministers could be seen as an arbitrary denial of such citizenship (contrast Genovese, cited above, § 34).

The issue whether or not the applicant has an arguable right to acquire citizenship of a State must in principle be resolved by reference to the domestic law of that State (see Kolosovskiy v. Latvia (dec.), no. 50183/99, 29 January 2004). Similarly, the question whether a person was denied a State's citizenship arbitrarily in a manner that might raise an issue under the Convention is to be determined with reference to the terms of the domestic law (see Fehér and Dolník v. Slovakia (dec.), nos. 14927/12 and 30415/12, § 41, 21 May 2013). The choice of criteria for the purposes of granting citizenship through naturalisation in accordance with domestic law is linked to the nature of the bond between the State and the individual concerned that each society deems necessary to ensure. In many jurisdictions, acquisition of citizenship is accompanied by an oath of allegiance whereby the individual pledges loyalty to the State. The Court has addressed the issue of loyalty, albeit in a slightly different context of electoral rights, and drawn a distinction between loyalty to the State and loyalty to the government (see Tănase, cited above, § 166).

The Court notes that the assessment of loyalty for the purposes of the naturalisation decision in the present case does not refer to loyalty to the government in power, but rather to the State and its Constitution. The Court considers that a democratic State is entitled to require persons who wish to acquire its citizenship to be loyal to the State and, in particular, to the constitutional principles on which it is founded. The applicant did not contest this. The Court agrees with the applicant that, in exercising his freedom of expression and assembly, he is free to disagree with government policies for as long as that critique takes place in accordance with the law; it is also true that the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than in relation to a private citizen or even a politician. However, this is an entirely different matter from the issue of the criteria set for naturalisation and its procedure, which are both determined by domestic law. The requirement of loyalty to the State and its Constitution cannot be considered as a punitive measure capable of interfering with the freedom of expression and assembly. Rather, it is a criterion which has to be fulfilled by any person seeking to obtain the Latvian citizenship through naturalisation.

The Court does not see in what manner the applicant has been prevented from expressing his disagreement with government policy on the issue of interest to him. Nor can the Court discern any facts which would indicate that he was prevented from participating in any meetings or movements.

Consequently, Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention are not applicable in the circumstances of the present case and the Court upholds the Government's objection.